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Hamm v. Arrowcreek Homeowner’s Ass’n, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 28 (May 15, 2008)1 
 
PROPERTY LAW- HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATION LIEN 
 
SUMMARY 
  
 Appeal from a district court order dismissing homeowner’s action that sought to release a 
homeowner’s association lien.  Under NRS 383.10, the district court must dismiss any dispute arising 
from the interpretation, application, or enforcement of homeowner’s associations’ covenants, conditions, 
and restrictions (CC&R) if the parties did not first submit to mediation or arbitration. This statute, 
however, does not apply to actions for injunctive relief involving “immediate threat of irreparable harm, 
or action[s] relating to the title to residential property.”2  
 
DISPOSITION/OUTCOME 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court held that filing of lien, in and of itself, does not create an “immediate 
or irreparable harm”3  and that action to release lien without more does not “relat[e] to the title of 
residential property.”4 Accordingly, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court holding that 
homeowners were required to submit their claims to an arbitration or mediation before instituting an 
action to the district court to release a lien. 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court also held that if the collection agency acts as the agent for the 
homeowners’ association and NRS 38.310 applies to the action against the homeowner’s association, 
then the statute applies equally to the collection agency. 
 
 Finally, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that NRS 38.310 does not violate the 
constitutional rights to a jury trial and equal protection under the law. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 In 2004, the appellants Michael and Cara Hamm purchased a home and an adjoining vacant lot in 
the Arrowcreek subdivision, a planned community in Reno, Nevada. According to Mr. and Mrs. Hamm, 
they were told that they would not be required to pay assessment fees on the vacant lot pursuant to 
Arrowcreek’s CC&R when they purchased the properties. 
 
 However, respondent Arrowcreek Homeowners Association (Arrowcreek HOA) sent them a 
notice assessing late fees and interest when the Mr. and Mrs. Hamm failed to pay the assessment fee on 
the vacant lot. Subsequently, Nevada Association Services (NAS), a collection agency, notified the 
appellants that they were required to pay Arrowcreek HOA the amount due within ten days to prevent the 
recording of a notice of delinquent assessment lien. Although Mr. and Mrs. Hamm immediately notified 
NAS that the assessment was disputed, NAS, at the direction of HOA, filed a notice of delinquent 
assessment lien with the county recorder. 
 
 The appellants filed a district court complaint against Arrowcreek HOA and NSA. The Hamms 
alleged, inter alia, that Arrowcreek’s actions clouded title to their properties and harmed their 
creditworthiness. 
                                                 
1 By Airene Haze 
2 NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.300(3) (amended affective January 1, 2008) 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
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 Arrowcreek HOA moved to dismiss the complaint under NRCP 12(b)(5), based on the Hamm’s 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for their failure to comply with NRS 
38.310. Under NRS 38.310, parties must submit claims relating to the interpretation and application of 
CC&R to mediation or arbitration before seeking relief in the district court. Alternatively, Arrowcreek 
HOA moved to compel mediation or arbitration pursuant to NRS 38.310.  
 
 The district court concluded that the Hamm’s complaint called for interpretation and enforcement 
of CC&R and, consequently dismissed the complaint. In its order, the district court stated that once 
arbitration was concluded, the Hamms could seek relief from the lien in the district court. The Hamms 
appealed.  
  
DISCUSSION 
 
 NRS 38.310(1), provides that “[n]o civil action based upon a claim relating to . . . [t]he 
interpretation, application or enforcement” of CC&Rs may be commenced in state court, “unless the 
action has been submitted to mediation or arbitration pursuant to the provisions of NRS 38.300 to 38.360, 
inclusive.”5  
 
 The Hamms argued that the provision does not apply to their action to release lien because (1) 
they sought not to interpret the CC&R, but merely to enforce prior interpretation of those CC&Rs; (2) for 
their action is not a “civil action” under NRS 38.310; and (3) the lien portion of their claims that was 
directed at NAS, which is not a homeowner’s association, was not subject to NRS 38.310.  
 
 The Hamms further contended that NRS 38.310 is unconstitutional because (1) it infringes on 
right to jury trial by requiring mediation or arbitration and (2) it violates equal protection because 
homeowner’ association may record a lien without submitting to mediation or arbitration, but 
homeowners must submit to mediation or arbitration before initiating an action in the district court to 
have the lien removed. 
 
NRS 38.310s application to action seeking “interpretation, application or enforcement of CC&Rs 
 
 Although the Hamms argued that they did not seek CC&R’s interpretation, the Hamms’ 
complaint explicitly stated that the Hamms sought “court intervention to interpret the language . . . of the 
Arrowcreek [HOA] CC&R’s.” Additionally, resolving the merits of the Hamm’s complaint would 
require the district court to interpret the CC&Rs’ meaning to determine whether Arrowcreek HOA’s 
assessment was proper. Accordingly, so long as the Hamm’s action constitutes a “civil action” for NRS 
38.310 purposes, and NRS 38.310 applies to NAS, the Hamms must submit their claims to arbitration or 
mediation before instituting an action in the district court. 
 
Definition of “civil action” for purposes of NRS 38.310 
  
 For NRS 38.310 purposes, a “civil action” does not include an action in equity for injunctive 
relief in which there is an immediate threat of irreparable harm, or an action relating to the title to 
residential property.”6 
 Based on these exceptions, the Hamms contend that their action seeking to remove the lien, was 
not a “civil action” under NRS Chapter 38 because the lien created an “immediate threat of irreparable 
                                                 
5 See  NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.4117(2) (requiring parties to comply with NRS 38.310 before suing for damages on claims 
arising from a failure or refusal to comply with homeowner’s association documents.) 
6 NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.300(3) (emphasis added) 
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harm” by clouding their titled and putting Arrowcreek in the position to foreclose on their property. They 
also contend that the matter was not a “civil action” because it was related to a residential title. 
 
 
Exception to the definition of “civil action”: “immediate  threat of irreparable harm” 
 
 “[A] lien is a security device that binds property to a debt and puts a party on notice that someone 
besides the owner of the property has an interest in that property.”7 This court has noted that a lien on 
property clouds that property title.8 However, whether the mere existence of a lien creates an immediate 
threat or irreparable harm depends on the meanings of “immediate” and “irreparable” 
 
 Although the Nevada Supreme Court has concluded that foreclosure may result in irreparable 
harm,9 a lien is merely a preliminary step to foreclosure and does not itself instantly implicate the loss of 
unique real property. 
 
 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania recognized that, “[i]n special circumstances, a court 
conceivably could find that a property owner would be irreparably harmed because of the existence of [a] 
lien.”10 However, the Pennsylvania court concluded that the property owners must allege and prove an 
irreparable harm “apart from the existence of the liens themselves”11  because liens usually may be 
removed by paying money or posting security. The Nevada Supreme Court found this reasoning 
persuasive and concluded that filing a lien, in and of itself, does not pose an immediate threat or 
irreparable harm. 
 
 Here, the Hamms did not allege or prove irreparable harm. Instead, they merely asserted that the 
lien clouded their title and harmed their perceived “creditworthiness”. Additionally, Arrowcreek HOA 
had not yet instituted a foreclosure proceeding. Hence, the district court did not err in concluding that 
Hamm’s action fell within the scope of NRS 38.310. 
 
Exception to definition of “civil action”: “an action relating to the title to residential  
property”12 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court also clarified that while a lien clouds a title, it exists separately from 
that title, and therefore, an action simply to remove the lied does not “relate to” residential title so as to 
fall outside the scope of NRS 38.310.  
 
 While a lien creates a security interest in a property, “[a] lien right alone does not give the lien 
holder right and title to property.”13 Instead the title14 remains with the property owner until the lien is 
enforced through foreclosure proceedings. Before that time, a lien merely gives its holder priority to the 
                                                 
7 State, Dep’t Human Res. v. Estate of Ullmer,  120 Nev. 108, 117, 87 P.3d 1045, 1051 (2004).  
8 See In re Contrevo, 123 Nev. 20, 24, 153 P.3d 652, 655 (2007); O’Dell v. Martin, 101 Nev. 142, 143, 696 P.2d 996, 
997 (1985) (explaining that federal tax liens recorded against the appellant’s property clouded title to that property.  
9 Dixon v. Thatcher, 103 Nev. 414, 416, 742 P.2d  1029, 1030 (1987) (holding that foreclosure poses irreparable harm 
“[b]ecause real property and its attributes are considered unique.”) 
10 LCN Real Estate v. Borough of Wyoming, 544 A.2d 1053, 1059 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988). 
11 Id. 
12 The Nevada Supreme Court has not previously addressed whether an action to release a lien constitute an “action 
relating to the title to residential property.” 
13 In re Marino, 205 B.R. 897, 899 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997). 
14  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1522 (8th ed. 2004). A title “constitut[es] the legal right to control and dispose of 
property.”  
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property and security for compensation. 15 Therefore, an action to remove the liens does not, in and of 
itself, “relate to” the owner’s title so as to come outside the definition of “civil action” for NRS 38.310 
purposes. 
 
 Here, Arrowcreek recorded a lien against the Hamms’ property, but it did not initiate proceedings 
to foreclose upon the lien. The filing of the lien created a monetary encumbrance that did not alter the 
Hamms’ title to property. Accordingly, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that Hamms’ action to 
release lien did not “relat[e] to the title to residential property.”16 
 
 Additionally, the Nevada Supreme Court also concluded that NRS 38.310 expresses Nevada’s 
public policy favoring arbitration of disputes involving interpretation of enforcement of CC&R.  
 
Application of NRS 38.310 to an action against a collection agency working as an agent for a 
homeowner’s association 
 
The Hamms argued that NRS 38.310 does not apply to their claim against NAS because NAS is a 
collection agency, not an “association.”  NAS argued that it was Arrowcreek HOA’s agent and therefore 
also subject to NRS 38.310.           
  
An agency relationship is created when one person possesses the contractual right to control 
another’s manner of performing the duties for which he or she was hired.17 The Nevada Supreme Court 
concluded that an agency relationship existed here because Arrowcreek HOA hired NAS to collect the 
Hamms’ alleged assessments and possessed the contractual right to direct NAS to record the lien on 
behalf of Arrowcreek HOA.  Therefore, NRS 38.310 applies to the Hamms’ claims against NAS just as it 
applies to their claims against Arrowcreek HOA.   
 
Constitutionality of NRS 38.310 
 
  The Hamms also argue that NRS 38.310 violates their constitutional rights to a jury trial and 
equal protection under the law.   
 
NRS 38.310 and the constitutional right to a jury trial 
Under Article 1, Section 3 of the Nevada Constitution, “[t]he right of trial by Jury shall be 
secured to all and remain inviolate forever; but a Jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases 
in the manner to be prescribed by law . . . .”  Here, NRS 38.310 does not require binding arbitration.  It 
merely requires that the parties submit to mediation, nonbinding arbitration, or binding arbitration before 
they initiate a civil action.18 If the parties agree to nonbinding arbitration, “any party to the arbitration 
may, within 30 days after a decision and award have been served upon the parties, commence a civil 
action in the proper court concerning the claim which was submitted for arbitration.”19  Even if the 
parties agree to binding arbitration, the arbitration award may be vacated and a rehearing granted 
pursuant to NRS 38.241.20          
                                                 
15 In re Marino, 205 B.R, at 899. 
16 NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.300(3) 
17 Grand Hotel Gift Shop v. Granite St. Ins., 108 Nev. 811, 815, 839 P.2d 599, 602 (1992); see also Mills v. Haggard, 58 
S.W.3d 164, 165 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding that collection agencies that attempts to collect on a promissory note secured 
by a lien “acts[] as agents for the various holders of the note.”) 
18 NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.310(1) 
19 NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.330(5) 
20 NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.330(6) 
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 Here, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that NRS 38.310 did not violate Hamms’ 
constitutional right. The Hamms and Arrowcreek could select mediation or arbitration pursuant to the 
provisions of NRS 38.330.  Additionally, Hamms had adequate legal remedies available to them upon 
the conclusion of either nonbinding or binding arbitration. 
 
NRS 38.310 and the constitutional right to equal protection 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees equal protection under the law.  If fundamental rights are not infringed or a suspect class is 
not involved, the statute will survive an equal protection attack so long as [it] is rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental purpose.”21  Here, no fundamental rights are involved, and the Nevada Supreme 
Court applied the rational basis test to assess the constitutionality of NRS 38.310.    
NRS 116.3116(1) provides that liens exist when assessments are due, regardless of any 
classification.  Thus, an association is not required to commence a civil action to record or perfect the 
lien, which already exists once assessments are due, and, therefore, such association need not submit to 
mediation or arbitration before recording the lien.  The Court concluded that NRS 38.310 does not treat 
similarly situated individuals differently because it requires mediation or arbitration before civil actions 
are initiated by homeowners or homeowners’ associations alike, without classification.    
  
Applying the rational basis test, the Court concluded that NRS 38.310’s requirement of 
mediation or arbitration is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest of assisting 
homeowners to achieve a quicker and less costly resolution of their disputes with homeowners’ 
associations. Therefore, NRS 38.310 does not violate equal protection principles 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Hamms’ action against 
Arrowcreek HOA because they had not submitted to mediation or arbitration pursuant to NRS 38.310.  
                                                 
21 Arata v. Faubion, 123 Nev. __, __, 161 P.3d 244, 248 (2007).  
